- Author: Keanna Grelicha, Cyber Analyst
- Author: Tara Gould, Threat Research Lead
- Summary: Cryptojacking attacks are rising as threat actors exploit hard-to-detect cryptomining malware. Learn how Darktrace detected and contained a cryptojacking attempt in its early stages using Autonomous Response, with expert analysis of the malware itself revealing insights into a novel cryptomining strain.
- Blog Category: On the Case: Incident Analysis
What is Cryptojacking?
Cryptojacking remains one of the most persistent cyber threats in the digital age, showing no signs of slowing down. It involves the unauthorized use of a computer or device’s processing power to mine cryptocurrencies, often without the owner’s consent or knowledge, using cryptojacking scripts or cryptocurrency mining (cryptomining) malware [1]. Unlike other widespread attacks such as ransomware, which disrupt operations and block access to data, cryptomining malware steals and drains computing and energy resources for mining to reduce attacker’s personal costs and increase “profits” earned from mining [1]. The impact on targeted organizations can be significant, ranging from data privacy concerns and reduced productivity to higher energy bills.
As cryptocurrency continues to grow in popularity, as seen with the ongoing high valuation of the global cryptocurrency market capitalization (almost USD 4 trillion at time of writing), threat actors will continue to view cryptomining as a profitable venture [2]. As a result, illicit cryptominers are being used to steal processing power via supply chain attacks or browser injections, as seen in a recent cryptojacking campaign using JavaScript [3][4].
Therefore, security teams should maintain awareness of this ongoing threat, as what is often dismissed as a ‘compliance issue’ can escalate into more severe compromises and lead to prolonged exposure of critical resources.
While having a security team capable of detecting and analyzing hijacking attempts is essential, emerging threats in today’s landscape often demand more than manual intervention.
In July 2025, Darktrace detected and contained an attempted cryptojacking incident on the network of a customer in the retail and e-commerce industry, when a threat actor attempted to use a PowerShell script to download and run NBMiner directly in memory.
In addition to highlighting Darktrace’s successful detection of the malicious activity and the role of Autonomous Response in halting the attack, this blog will also include novel insights from Darktrace’s threat researchers on the cryptominer payload, showing how the attack chain was initiated through the execution of a PowerShell-based payload.
Darktrace’s Coverage of Cryptojacking via PowerShell
The initial compromise was detected on July 22, when Darktrace / NETWORK observed the use of a new PowerShell user agent during a connection to an external endpoint, indicating an attempt at remote code execution.
Specifically, the targeted desktop device established a connection to the rare endpoint, 45.141.87[.]195, over destination port 8000 using HTTP as the application-layer protocol. Within this connection, Darktrace observed the presence of a PowerShell script in the URI, specifically ‘/infect.ps1’.
Darktrace’s analysis of this endpoint (45.141.87[.]195[:]8000/infect.ps1) and the payload it downloaded indicated it was a dropper used to deliver an obfuscated AutoIt loader. This attribution was further supported by open-source intelligence (OSINT) reporting [5]. The loader likely then injected NBMiner into a legitimate process on the customer’s environment – the first documented case of NBMiner being dropped in this way.

Figure 1: Darktrace’s detection of a device making an HTTP connection with new PowerShell user agent, indicating PowerShell abuse for command-and-control (C2) communications.
Script files are often used by malicious actors for malware distribution. In cryptojacking attacks specifically, scripts are used to download and install cryptomining software, which then attempts to connect to cryptomining pools to begin mining operations [6].
Inside the Payload: Technical Analysis of the Malicious Script and Cryptomining Loader
To confidently establish that the malicious script file dropped an AutoIt loader used to deliver the NBMiner cryptominer, Darktrace’s threat researchers reverse engineered the payload. Analysis of the file ‘infect.ps1’ revealed further insights, ultimately linking it to the execution of a cryptominer loader.

Figure 2: Screenshot of the ‘infect.ps1’ PowerShell script observed in the attack.
The ‘infect.ps1’ script is a heavily obfuscated PowerShell script that contains multiple variables of Base64 and XOR encoded data. The first data blob is XOR’d with a value of 97, after decoding, the data is a binary and stored in APPDATA/local/knzbsrgw.exe. The binary is AutoIT.exe, the legitimate executable of the AutoIt programming language. The script also performs a check for the existence of the registry key HKCU:\\Software\LordNet.
The second data blob ($cylcejlrqbgejqryxpck) is written to APPDATA\rauuq, where it will later be read and XOR decoded. The third data blob ($tlswqbblxmmr)decodes to an obfuscated AutoIt script, which is written to %LOCALAPPDATA%\qmsxehehhnnwioojlyegmdssiswak. To ensure persistence, a shortcut file named xxyntxsmitwgruxuwqzypomkhxhml.lnk is created to run at startup.

Figure 3: Screenshot of second stage AutoIt script.
The observed AutoIt script is a process injection loader. It reads an encrypted binary from /rauuq in APPDATA, then XOR-decodes every byte with the key 47 to reconstruct the payload in memory. Next, it silently launches the legitimate Windows app ‘charmap.exe’ (Character Map) and obtains a handle with full access. It allocates executable and writable memory inside that process, writes the decrypted payload into the allocated region, and starts a new thread at that address. Finally, it closes the thread and process handles.
The binary that is injected into charmap.exe is 64-bit Windows binary. On launch, it takes a snapshot of running processes and specifically checks whether Task Manager is open. If Task Manager is detected, the binary kills sigverif.exe; otherwise, it proceeds. Once the condition is met, NBMiner is retrieved from a Chimera URL (https://api[.]chimera-hosting[.]zip/frfnhis/zdpaGgLMav/nbminer%5B.%5Dexe) and establishes persistence, ensuring that the process automatically restarts if terminated. When mining begins, it spawns a process with the arguments ‘-a kawpow -o asia.ravenminer.com:3838 -u R9KVhfjiqSuSVcpYw5G8VDayPkjSipbiMb.worker -i 60’ and hides the process window to evade detection.

Figure 4: Observed NBMiner arguments.
The program includes several evasion measures. It performs anti-sandboxing by sleeping to delay analysis and terminates sigverif.exe (File Signature Verification). It checks for installed antivirus products and continues only when Windows Defender is the sole protection. It also verifies whether the current user has administrative rights. If not, it attempts a User Account Control (UAC) bypass via Fodhelper to silently elevate and execute its payload without prompting the user. The binary creates a folder under %APPDATA%, drops rtworkq.dll extracted from its own embedded data, and copies ‘mfpmp.exe’ from System32 into that directory to side-load ‘rtworkq.dll’. It also looks for the registry key HKCU\Software\kap, creating it if it does not exist, and reads or sets a registry value it expects there.
Zooming Out: Darktrace Coverage of NBMiner
Darktrace’s analysis of the malicious PowerShell script provides clear evidence that the payload downloaded and executed the NBMiner cryptominer. Once executed, the infected device is expected to attempt connections to cryptomining endpoints (mining pools). Darktrace initially observed this on the targeted device once it started making DNS requests for a cryptominer endpoint, “gulf[.]moneroocean[.]stream” [7], one minute after the connection involving the malicious script.

Figure 5: Darktrace Advanced Search logs showcasing the affected device making a DNS request for a Monero mining endpoint.
Though DNS requests do not necessarily mean the device connected to a cryptominer-associated endpoint, Darktrace detected connections to the endpoint specified in the DNS Answer field: monerooceans[.]stream, 152.53.121[.]6. The attempted connections to this endpoint over port 10001 triggered several high-fidelity model alerts in Darktrace related to possible cryptomining mining activity. The IP address and destination port combination (152.53.121[.]6:10001) has also been linked to cryptomining activity by several OSINT security vendors [8][9].

Figure 6: Darktrace’s detection of a device establishing connections with the Monero Mining-associated endpoint, monerooceans[.]stream over port 10001.
Darktrace / NETWORK grouped together the observed indicators of compromise (IoCs) on the targeted device and triggered an additional Enhanced Monitoring model designed to identify activity indicative of the early stages of an attack. These high-fidelity models are continuously monitored and triaged by Darktrace’s SOC team as part of the Managed Threat Detection service, ensuring that subscribed customers are promptly notified of malicious activity as soon as it emerges.

Figure 7: Darktrace’s correlation of the initial PowerShell-related activity with the cryptomining endpoint, showcasing a pattern indicative of an initial attack chain.
Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst launched an autonomous investigation into the ongoing activity and was able to link the individual events of the attack, encompassing the initial connections involving the PowerShell script to the ultimate connections to the cryptomining endpoint, likely representing cryptomining activity. Rather than viewing these seemingly separate events in isolation, Cyber AI Analyst was able to see the bigger picture, providing comprehensive visibility over the attack.

Figure 8: Darktrace’s Cyber AI Analyst view illustrating the extent of the cryptojacking attack mapped against the Cyber Kill Chain.
Darktrace’s Autonomous Response
Fortunately, as this customer had Darktrace configured in Autonomous Response mode, Darktrace was able to take immediate action by preventing the device from making outbund connections and blocking specific connections to suspicious endpoints, thereby containing the attack.

Figure 9: Darktrace’s Autonomous Response actions automatically triggered based on the anomalous connections observed to suspicious endpoints.
Specifically, these Autonomous Response actions prevented the outgoing communication within seconds of the device attempting to connect to the rare endpoints.

Figure 10: Darktrace’s Autonomous Response blocked connections to the mining-related endpoint within a second of the initial connection.
Additionally, the Darktrace SOC team was able to validate the effectiveness of the Autonomous Response actions by analyzing connections to 152.53.121[.]6 using the Advanced Search feature. Across more than 130 connection attempts, Darktrace’s SOC confirmed that all were aborted, meaning no connections were successfully established.

Figure 11: Advanced Search logs showing all attempted connections that were successfully prevented by Darktrace’s Autonomous Response capability.
Conclusion
Cryptojacking attacks will remain prevalent, as threat actors can scale their attacks to infect multiple devices and networks. What’s more, cryptomining incidents can often be difficult to detect and are even overlooked as low-severity compliance events, potentially leading to data privacy issues and significant energy bills caused by misused processing power.
Darktrace’s anomaly-based approach to threat detection identifies early indicators of targeted attacks without relying on prior knowledge or IoCs. By continuously learning each device’s unique pattern of life, Darktrace can detect subtle deviations that may signal a compromise.
In this case, the cryptojacking attack was quickly identified and mitigated during the early stages of malware and cryptomining activity. Darktrace’s Autonomous Response was able to swiftly contain the threat before it could advance further along the attack lifecycle, minimizing disruption and preventing the attack from potentially escalating into a more severe compromise.
Credit to Keanna Grelicha (Cyber Analyst) and Tara Gould (Threat Research Lead)
Appendices
Darktrace Model Detections
NETWORK Models:
- Compromise / High Priority Crypto Currency Mining (Enhanced Monitoring Model)
- Device / Initial Attack Chain Activity (Enhanced Monitoring Model)
- Compromise / Suspicious HTTP and Anomalous Activity (Enhanced Monitoring Model)
- Compromise / Monero Mining
- Anomalous File / Script from Rare External Location
- Device / New PowerShell User Agent
- Anomalous Connection / New User Agent to IP Without Hostname
- Anomalous Connection / Powershell to Rare External
- Device / Suspicious Domain
Cyber AI Analyst Incident Events:
- Detect \ Event \ Possible HTTP Command and Control
- Detect \ Event \ Cryptocurrency Mining Activity
Autonomous Response Models:
- Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Alerts Over Time Block
- Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious Activity Block
- Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Enhanced Monitoring from Client Block
- Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena Crypto Currency Mining Block
- Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena File then New Outbound Block
- Antigena / Network::External Threat::Antigena Suspicious File Block
- Antigena / Network::Significant Anomaly::Antigena Significant Anomaly from Client Block
List of Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
(IoC – Type – Description + Confidence)
- 45.141.87[.]195:8000/infect.ps1 – IP Address, Destination Port, Script – Malicious PowerShell script
- gulf.moneroocean[.]stream – Hostname – Monero Endpoint
- monerooceans[.]stream – Hostname – Monero Endpoint
- 152.53.121[.]6:10001 – IP Address, Destination Port – Monero Endpoint
- 152.53.121[.]6 – IP Address – Monero Endpoint
- https://api[.]chimera-hosting[.]zip/frfnhis/zdpaGgLMav/nbminer%5B.%5Dexe – Hostname, Executable File – NBMiner
- Db3534826b4f4dfd9f4a0de78e225ebb – Hash – NBMiner loader
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
(Tactic – Technique – Sub-Technique)
- Vulnerabilities – RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT – T1588.006 – T1588
- Exploits – RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT – T1588.005 – T1588
- Malware – RESOURCE DEVELOPMENT – T1588.001 – T1588
- Drive-by Compromise – INITIAL ACCESS – T1189
- PowerShell – EXECUTION – T1059.001 – T1059
- Exploitation of Remote Services – LATERAL MOVEMENT – T1210
- Web Protocols – COMMAND AND CONTROL – T1071.001 – T1071
- Application Layer Protocol – COMMAND AND CONTROL – T1071
- Resource Hijacking – IMPACT – T1496
- Obfuscated Files – DEFENSE EVASION – T1027
- Bypass UAC – PRIVILEGE ESCALATION – T1548.002
- Process Injection – PRIVILEGE ESCALATION – T055
- Debugger Evasion – DISCOVERY – T1622
- Logon Autostart Execution – PERSISTENCE – T1547.009
Sources:
[2] https://coinmarketcap.com/
[3] https://www.ibm.com/think/topics/cryptojacking
[4] https://thehackernews.com/2025/07/3500-websites-hijacked-to-secretly-mine.html
[5] https://urlhaus.abuse.ch/url/3589032/
[6] https://www.logpoint.com/en/blog/uncovering-illegitimate-crypto-mining-activity/
[7] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/gulf.moneroocean.stream/detection
[8] https://www.virustotal.com/gui/domain/monerooceans.stream/detection
The content provided in this blog is published by Darktrace for general informational purposes only and reflects our understanding of cybersecurity topics, trends, incidents, and developments at the time of publication. While we strive to ensure accuracy and relevance, the information is provided “as is” without any representations or warranties, express or implied. Darktrace makes no guarantees regarding the completeness, accuracy, reliability, or timeliness of any information presented and expressly disclaims all warranties.
Nothing in this blog constitutes legal, technical, or professional advice, and readers should consult qualified professionals before acting on any information contained herein. Any references to third-party organizations, technologies, threat actors, or incidents are for informational purposes only and do not imply affiliation, endorsement, or recommendation.
Darktrace, its affiliates, employees, or agents shall not be held liable for any loss, damage, or harm arising from the use of or reliance on the information in this blog.
The cybersecurity landscape evolves rapidly, and blog content may become outdated or superseded. We reserve the right to update, modify, or remove any content without notice.
Darktrace Unveils Automated Forensics Capabilities in its ActiveAI Security Platform™ to Advance Hybrid and Multi-Cloud Security
Posted in Commentary with tags Darktrace on September 26, 2025 by itnerdDarktrace, today announced the launch of Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation™, the industry’s first truly automated cloud forensics solution. The solution provides security teams immediate access to forensic-level data, equipping them with critical context to investigate threats quickly and thoroughly across hybrid, multi-cloud and on-premises environments. When paired with the newly enhanced Darktrace / CLOUD™, organizations gain a complete cloud security solution that combines posture management with real-time detection, response and forensic investigation – potentially reducing investigation times from days to mere minutes.
Cloud adoption has outpaced security operations, creating blind spots that adversaries are quick to exploit. Nearly 90% of organizations report suffering damage before they can contain cloud incidents, and 65% say investigations take three to five days longer in the cloud compared to on-premises environments, according to a survey of 300 cloud security decision makers. Traditional log-based alerts miss behaviors such as lateral movement or privilege escalation, while evidence from ephemeral assets like containers and serverless functions often disappears before it can be collected — leaving security teams struggling to respond effectively.
At the same time, attacks against cloud workloads are increasingly aggressive. New analysis of Darktrace’s Cloudypot honeypots reveals that attacks on tools like Jupyter Notebooks often arrive in sudden bursts, generating high volumes of attacks in a short period of time from a small group of persistent attackers. These findings highlight that when adversaries target the cloud, they strike quickly and at scale, leaving defenders little time to investigate before critical evidence disappears.
Introducing Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation
Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation is an automated forensic investigation solution designed for the speed and complexity of modern cloud environments. It captures and analyzes host-level evidence — including disk, memory, and logs — at the exact moment a threat is detected, even from short-lived assets such as containers or serverless workloads. These investigations can be triggered by Darktrace or by detections from existing cloud security tools.
Unlike point solutions that depend on manual snapshots or agents, Darktrace collects evidence directly through cloud APIs, ensuring investigations begin instantly, and critical data from ephemeral workloads is never lost. By preserving volatile data and reconstructing attacker behavior in real time, the solution adds critical context to everyday investigations, enabling security teams to understand root causes quickly and shorten investigation times from days to mere minutes — a critical advantage as over 40% of organizations report suffering significant damage from cloud alerts that were never investigated at all.
This solution represents the evolution of capabilities gained through Darktrace’s acquisition of Cado Security earlier this year, alongside continued research and development investment to expand and advance Darktrace’s cloud security portfolio.
Key capabilities of the Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation solution include:
Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation can be deployed as a standalone product, giving new customers immediate access to automated cloud forensics to support SOC and incident response teams in their day-to-day management of cloud security threats, or integrated across the Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platform for end-to-end investigations and response across an organization’s entire digital estate. It is particularly powerful when paired with Darktrace / CLOUD, where the two solutions bring real-time cloud detection and response and forensic-level investigation together in a single workflow.
Unifying Cloud Detection, Response, and Forensic Investigation with Darktrace / CLOUD
Customers can now add Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation capabilities to Darktrace’s leading cloud detection and response (CDR) product. With Darktrace / CLOUD, security teams benefit from:
When adding Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation to Darktrace / CLOUD, the solutions work together seamlessly to detect threats as they emerge and preserve the forensic evidence needed to investigate them. As Darktrace / CLOUD detects and blocks suspicious cloud activity, Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation will capture disk, memory, and log data from the affected asset, allowing teams to immediately contain threats while preserving the critical evidence needed to investigate and remediate the incident.
Alongside this integration, Darktrace has strengthened its core cloud capabilities to make investigations even faster and more intuitive. Enhancements include more intuitive cloud architecture diagrams that make complex environments easier to interpret, along with expanded detection of advanced attacker techniques such as lateral movement, command-and-control, and privilege escalation.
When uniting threat detection, response, and automated forensics in one platform, security teams can shift cloud investigations from reactive and fragmented to fast, automated, and context-rich — enabling organizations to harness the benefits of the cloud while effectively mitigating risks.
Availability
Darktrace / Forensic Acquisition & Investigation, the integrations across the Darktrace ActiveAI Security Platform and new features in Darktrace / CLOUD are available now.
Leave a comment »