Researchers from the Dutch National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC-NL) and cybersecurity company Modat identified 8,547 internet-exposed systems across European wind farms and solar parks, including administrative interfaces and operational control panels that should not be publicly accessible, according to new research.
The researchers examined renewable energy facilities across 40 European countries and identified exposed systems in 35. Of those, 7,942 were associated with solar installations across 34 countries, while 605 were linked to wind farms across 23 countries.
Some exposed interfaces displayed live electricity production data, turbine locations and operational controls labeled Start, Stop and Reset.
Researchers estimated that approximately 181 sites could potentially allow full operational control. Other exposed pages included administrative login screens, with one displaying the default username “root.” Some interfaces could manage multiple turbines or an entire wind farm.
The researchers said the 8,547 figure is likely an undercount because only systems confidently associated with specific facilities were included.
ㅤDamon Small, Board of Directors, Xcape, Inc.:
“Unauthenticated, Internet-exposed interfaces on critical infrastructure threaten regional grid resilience and create operational, legal, and reputational risk across renewable energy portfolios. The discovery of over 8,500 exposed European wind and solar management endpoints, including over 180 permitting full operational intervention, highlights fundamental identity and network perimeter failures. While remote access to operational technology (OT) systems is a clear operational requirement, it must be delivered securely through zero-trust access, network segmentation, and multi-factor authentication rather than exposing control panels directly to the public Internet. To prevent these foolish architectural decisions, organizations must conduct mandatory threat models and architecture reviews before production systems go live, while immediately pulling existing interfaces behind secure gateways and enforcing credential rotation.”
Critical Takeaways
- Publicly exposing OT control interfaces directly to the Internet turns standard management features into severe grid resilience vulnerabilities.
- Remote access is a valid operational requirement, but it must be mediated via zero-trust architecture, multi-factor authentication, and secure gateways.
- Formal architecture reviews and threat modeling must occur prior to live deployment to catch perimeter and identity flaws early.
Threat modeling before deployment costs a fraction of what an incident responder will charge to explain why “root” was still the password.
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Steven Swift, Managing Director, Suzu Labs:
“This isn’t an AI problem, even if the authors of the research claim that “AI made things a little faster” We’ve seen decades of organizations putting resources directly onto the public internet with minimal to no protections in place, and then act surprised when its found and exploited.
“There’s already a rich well developed industry of mapping the entire attack surface of literally every single public IP. This isn’t new, and it doesn’t depend on AI. If you put a resource on the internet, existing (non-ai) automation will find it, document it, and put it into a database for easy access by others.
“For this research specifically, there’s a mix of single devices and management interfaces for groups of devices. That said, much of the wind and solar infrastructure is decentralized. So while 8,500 devices being directly exposed to the internet is a lot, if a threat actor wanted to cause harm, they would be limited to a subset of these at a time.
“That’s still a problem. Power is part of critical infrastructure. People want their power to keep working, and not to have an outage because someone decided to hack in. If an attacker wanted to cause harm, rather than simply turning power generation off they could tamper with the working configuration. If the system can be misconfigured to intentionally overload for example, permanent damage could result.
“This is an example where security best practices are completely basic, yet still not being followed. Literally just don’t have equipment directly exposed to the internet. Having remote access to systems is fine, but it needs to be secure. Putting equipment behind a secure VPN for example is only minimally more complex to setup, and orders of magnitude more secure.”
ㅤThreat actors will always target stuff like this because they can pwn it easily. Thus your job is to not be the guy who gets pwned.
MoneyGram hack claimed by The Gentleman, 60M customers at risk
Posted in Commentary with tags Comparitech on October 12, 2026 by itnerdThe Gentlemen ransomware gang has claimed an attack on MoneyGram, one of the world’s largest payment networks, and is threatening to release the stolen data. MoneyGram serves 60 million active customers across more than 200 countries.
Rebecca Moody, Head of Data Research at Comparitech:
“The Gentlemen has become one of the most prolific ransomware groups of recent years and isn’t known for fabricating its claims. MoneyGram needs to issue a statement as soon as possible to either reassure its customers that a breach hasn’t occurred or warn them of any potential unauthorized access to its systems.
Financial organizations are a key target for ransomware groups because of the highly sensitive data they deal with. The Gentlemen has claimed 46 attacks on such entities so far this year.
Also of note is its attack on a South African tech company, MIP Holdings. This took place in June 2026, with MIP paying The Gentlemen a ransom to delete the stolen data. However, The Gentlemen has now started targeting MIP’s clients and is issuing them with their own ransom demand. This serves as a key reminder that paying a ransomware group to delete data doesn’t guarantee any data will be deleted. In MoneyGram’s case, regardless of whether or not negotiations are successful, individual customers could be contacted by the group. Therefore, MoneyGram’s customers and employees should be on high alert for any potential phishing messages and unauthorized account activity.”
Brian Higgins, Security Specialist at Comparitech:
“It’s very early in the incident response timeline but that’s no reason for anyone who may be affected should this attack prove genuine not to be extra vigilant whilst more details become available. It’s not MoneyGram’s first rodeo so there’s a good chance they will be able to offer decent information and advice as things progress, so it would be a good idea to monitor their comms output. Unfortunately these days more and more people are aware of the personal mitigations they should be considering; changing passwords, monitoring accounts, ignoring and reporting unsolicited contact and checking they have two-factor authentication applied wherever possible etc, but given the volume and diversity of the potentially vulnerable client base on this occasion it’s worth checking in with family, friends and others in your community to make sure they are doing the same. Nobody wants to be worried about their personal financial info being compromised going into Thanksgiving and Christmas so it can only help to look after each other where you can.”
Comparitech in August published a study of The Gentleman ransomware, which can be read here: https://www.comparitech.com/news/the-gentlemen-ransomware-stats-on-attacks-ransoms-data-breaches/
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