Archive for DoJ

Honeywell’s $2M settlement shows self-attestation is now a legal liability, not a formality

Posted in Commentary with tags on September 4, 2026 by itnerd

The DOJ announced Honeywell Aerospace will pay over $2 million to settle False Claims Act allegations tied to NIST 800-171 non-compliance on a DoD contract. 

The Justice Department announced today that Honeywell Aerospace Inc. has agreed to pay $2,042,518 to resolve allegations that it is liable under the False Claims Act for failing to comply with cybersecurity requirements in a contract with the U.S. Department of Defense. Honeywell Aerospace, a corporation headquartered in Phoenix, Arizona, provides aerospace products and solutions to government and commercial customers. Prior to June 29, when Honeywell Aerospace became a standalone public company, it was a business segment of Honeywell International Inc., of Charlotte, North Carolina.

“Government contractors that obtain defense information in administering their contracts must follow required cybersecurity standards,” said Assistant Attorney General Brett A. Shumate of the Justice Department’s Civil Division. “The Justice Department will continue to investigate potential violations of these cybersecurity requirements to protect this critical information.”

“Cybersecurity requirements and standards for federal contractors are in place for a reason: to protect government systems and prevent unauthorized access to government data,” said U.S. Attorney Russ Ferguson for the Western District of North Carolina. “Companies that seek and profit off of government contracts have an obligation to ensure sensitive data is protected.”

The settlement resolves allegations that from April 2020 through December 2023, a business unit of Honeywell International Inc. submitted false claims for payment by failing to comply with cybersecurity requirements specified in National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-171, with respect to one of Honeywell’s networks, as required by the contract and regulation.

Justin Beals, CEO & Founder, Strike Graph had this to say:

“”Two million dollars gets the headline, but the number I keep coming back to is eight years. NIST 800-171 has been a contractual requirement since 2017, and Honeywell Aerospace isn’t a two-person shop that couldn’t find the standard — it’s one of the most sophisticated suppliers in the defense industrial base. The government is alleging that from 2020 through 2023, one of its networks didn’t meet requirements the company had already represented to the Department of Defense that it met. That’s the part people miss when they treat a self-assessment like a checkbox. It isn’t a checkbox. When you put a score in SPRS or sign an attestation, you’re making a legal representation to the federal government, and the False Claims Act is the mechanism that turns a paperwork gap into a fraud claim. The whistleblower here was a former employee who walked away with $375,000. Every disgruntled employee, every competitor, every subcontractor in your flow-down is now someone who can see whether your practice actually matches your paperwork. I spent my career building and shipping software, and I’ll say it plainly:

I have never met the engineer who could grade their own work and be right every time. Quality assurance saved me more times than I can count. This settlement is what happens when nobody checked the work.Here’s what actually worries me about this pause. A third-party assessment was never just a hoop to jump through — it was risk mitigation. A C3PAO comes in, validates your implementation, and stands behind that determination, which absorbs exactly the kind of exposure Honeywell just paid two million dollars to resolve. Suspend the phase-two rollout and that requirement doesn’t go anywhere. 800-171 is still in the contract, and the False Claims Act is still the enforcement engine. What goes away is the guidance and the validation. So companies are now shouldering the full weight of getting it right on their own, with no assessor checking whether their self-attestation would survive contact with a whistleblower or a DCIS investigation. And here’s the operator’s reality nobody’s saying out loud: doing this without an experienced assessor usually costs more, not less. I’ve watched companies burn months on false starts because they couldn’t even identify where their controlled data lived or which systems touched it. A good assessor catches that early. Go it alone and you find it in year three, after you’ve already built the wrong thing — or you find out the way Honeywell just did. The ‘delay’ didn’t take the cost off the table. It pushed the cost downstream, pulled the guidance out of the room, and left the fine sitting right where it was. I have loved ones in and around this mission, and the people who wear the uniform are counting on this data being protected. A steady, honest path is cheaper than a settlement, every single time.”

Organizations need to ensure that they follow all rules and regulations at all times without fail. Otherwise I hope that the DoJ smacks them silly until they comply.

Chinese hacking platform takedown exposes an ORB network hiding in your routers 

Posted in Commentary with tags , on August 27, 2026 by itnerd

The DOJ and FBI just disrupted QTFY, a Chinese state-linked hacking platform built around QScan, which scanned the internet for vulnerable IoT and SOHO devices, and QTRouter, which enrolled those devices into an obfuscation mesh to hide attacker traffic. Authorities seized the domains hard-coded into the malware, making the tooling inoperable across every operation that relied on it, not just one campaign. The FBI also flagged business ties between the company behind QTFY and groups like Salt Typhoon and i-Soon.

Josh Picolet, VP of Detection & Analysis, Team Cymru had this to say:

“QTFY is a useful case study in how state-linked contracting networks actually operate. The detail worth noting is what QScan was built to do. It scanned the internet, likely in a very targeted manner, for vulnerable IoT/SOHO devices and enrolled them into QTRouter, the layer that hid the actual operations behind a mesh of compromised hardware. That is the operating model of an ORB network, an operational relay box mesh assembled from hijacked edge devices, and it is exactly the type infrastructure ecosystem we have been tracking at Team Cymru for years. QTFY is one network in a much larger pattern. Turning routers, IoT gear, and SOHO devices into an obfuscation layer for attacker traffic is not a one-off tactic bolted onto a single contractor. It is how China’s freelance hacking and contracting market has learned to work, and the business ties noted here to Salt Typhoon and i-Soon are the visible edge of a quartermaster model that resells capability and access across many customers.

That model is also why the takedown landed the way it did. The domains were hard-coded into the malware for communication and authentication, so seizing that infrastructure made the tooling inoperable across every operation depending on it, not just one intrusion. Detection built around a single campaign’s indicators would never have surfaced a platform built to be shared across operators. What exposes infrastructure like this is the ability to detect the shared obfuscation layer underneath the operations, recognizing the mesh as a repeatable tradecraft pattern rather than a scatter of unrelated victims.

Defenders should not expect this one to fade. The quartermaster model and the compromise of edge devices for obfuscation will be fought for years to come. We track a large number of these ORB mesh networks, and the modus operandi across them is remarkably consistent. That is why we tag and track every model of router, IoT, and SOHO device we can observe, so these networks can be detected early and customers get a real risk level on the IPs involved. Organizations in defense, telecom, and critical infrastructure should be asking whether their own detection reaches that layer, well past the perimeter.”

Disruptions like this are good. But what will really solve the issue is going after the people behind these schemes and bringing them to justice. That way the profitability gets taken out of activities like these.

DOJ Takes Down Cracked And Nulled Marketplaces

Posted in Commentary with tags on January 31, 2025 by itnerd

The DOJ made an announcement detailing an international effort that seized the Cracked and Nulled Marketplaces. Prosecutors said this affected at least 17 million Americans.

The two forums were called Cracked and Nulled. According to the DOJ, since 2018, Cracked promised access to “billions of leaked websites” by letting users search for stolen login credentials and had over 4 million users who traded in cybercriminal tools and stolen information producing around $4 million in revenue.

The DOJ press release said that the accused “active administrator” of Nulled faces criminal charges with a maximum penalty of five years in prison for conspiracy to traffic in passwords, 10 years in prison for access device fraud, and 15 years in prison for identity fraud, the DOJ said.

Evan Dornbush, former NSA cybersecurity expert had this to say:

  “Historically attackers can more easily obtain information and tools than defenders, giving them a perpetual advantage. Actions like this make it more expensive for cyber criminals to operate and ultimately this is a good thing.

  “Lesser players who rely on purchasing tools and network access from these two marketplaces won’t be able to get started, raising the barrier to entry for their criminal enterprise aspirations.”

It’s great to see sites like these taken down by the forces of good. This is something that we need to see more of. A lot more of.

DOJ Discloses Operation That Deleted PlugX Malware from 4,250 Hacked Computers

Posted in Commentary with tags on January 15, 2025 by itnerd

The DOJ has disclosed that a multi-month law enforcement operation allowed the FBI to delete PRC-associated PlugX malware from over 4,250 infected computers:

The Justice Department and FBI today announced a multi-month law enforcement operation that, alongside international partners, deleted “PlugX” malware from thousands of infected computers worldwide. As described in court documents unsealed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a group of hackers sponsored by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), known to the private sector as “Mustang Panda” and “Twill Typhoon,” used a version of PlugX malware to infect, control, and steal information from victim computers.

According to court documents, the PRC government paid the Mustang Panda group to, among other computer intrusion services, develop this specific version of PlugX. Since at least 2014, Mustang Panda hackers then infiltrated thousands of computer systems in campaigns targeting U.S. victims, as well as European and Asian governments and businesses, and Chinese dissident groups. Despite previous cybersecurity reports, owners of computers still infected with PlugX are typically unaware of the infection. The court-authorized operation announced today remediated U.S.-based computers infected with Mustang Panda’s version of PlugX.    

Roger Grimes, Data-Driven Defense Evangelist at KnowBe4 had the following comment on this news:

“It’s always a good day when the good guys get a win! As simple as it seems for anyone to go in and proactively remove malware, it really isn’t easy to do. First, you’ve got to make sure you can do it legally. That often takes lawyers and legal review, and in most cases, lawyers with experience in global cybercriminals and laws. It takes someone in law enforcement who cares enough to push it. They’ve got to make a case and get it approved by senior management. Then, the removal process has to be tested.” 

“In this case, the FBI relied upon the bot’s own removal instructions, but it isn’t always this easy. Historically, there have been instances of less mature and capable but well-meaning defenders who have less elegantly removed malware and caused more problems than the malware did. The solution has to be tested and retested. Then, it has to be globally coordinated to happen as quickly as it can before the attackers know something is up and implement defenses.” 

“The overall process is more difficult than it first sounds. There’s a reason why proactive removal isn’t that common. With that said, it does seem like we are seeing just a bit more of these proactive removal projects than we used to see. Of course, expect to see the hackers respond by making it harder for unauthorized removal schemes to take place. It’s a business, and the bad guys see the good guys as adversaries and will respond accordingly. The bad guys won’t sit back and stay defeated. They will respond. They will make it harder for future efforts to be as successful. But for today, let’s celebrate the win!”

Wins seem to be hard to come by these days. Thus I will take this one. But realistically what needs to happen is prevention and detection means need to be better so that actions like these are the exception.

The FBI’s Data Handling Practices Ripped By The DoJ

Posted in Commentary with tags , on August 28, 2024 by itnerd

The FBI has faced significant lapses in handling and disposing of electronic storage media seized during investigations, according to a scathing audit by the Department of Justice’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG). The audit reveals that storage devices containing sensitive information, including national security data, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) material, and documents classified as Secret, were often improperly labeled or not labeled at all, heightening the risk of loss or theft.

The OIG’s report was addressed to FBI Director Christopher Wray and underscores the gravity of these findings. Despite FBI protocols mandating strict procedures for labeling and securing such data, the agency failed to consistently adhere to these guidelines. The report highlights instances where media containing classified information was stored in unapproved containers or locations, significantly compromising security. Additionally, the FBI’s process for the destruction of these devices was found to be inadequate, with critical gaps that could potentially expose sensitive information to unauthorized access.

Cigent CGO Brett Hansen had this comment:

“Meeting mission requirements and the ever-evolving threat landscape can make ensuring the integrity of data throughout its lifecycle a daunting task. Organizations like the FBI first need to universally adopt proven techniques and technology for safeguarding vulnerable data at the edge. These include Hardware Full Drive Encryption with Pre-boot Authentication and Multi Factor Authentication. Proper disposal of data is also imperative and again there are technologies that can verify all data is permanently erased.”

The FBI of all people need to do a much better job of safeguarding data. Hopefully this report not only “encourages” them to do better. But sends a message to everyone else to step up their game.