Let me introduce you to Optimizely. They bill themselves as “The AI platform to create and optimize every digital experience. So the experience-makers can do the work they love.” And they have just been pwned by a supply chain attack:
A supply chain attack targeting Optimizely has led to malicious JavaScript being loaded on numerous popular websites, including Zoom, CNN, Fox News, BBC, Salesforce, and GitLab, exposing visitors to scripts designed to steal cryptocurrency and payment information and exploit vulnerabilities in iOS devices.
Optimizely is a digital experience and experimentation platform used by organizations to test and personalize their websites, with its JavaScript files loaded into customers’ webpages to deliver this functionality.
The company confirmed to BleepingComputer that attackers exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow to inject malicious JavaScript into customer projects, causing websites using the platform to load malware.
I have commentary from Tyler Reguly, Associate Director of Security R&D of Fortra:
Years ago, websites were simple… a few lines of HTML, a markup language, that rendered information in your browser for human consumption. Today, websites might as well be complete software packages and, like software packages, they have dependencies. These dependencies come in the form of various JavaScript pages that are included from vendors and open-source projects designed to simplify life for the website developer, just as libraries simplify the lives of software developers.
The problem is that these dependencies are typically hosted with other vendors, which makes them part of your supply chain and opens the door for multiple breach vectors. Even if your environment is completely secure, every new dependency that you add is another window that needs to be locked, and you have no control over the lock.
That’s what happened here… Optimizely was breached, allowing attackers to compromise multiple other websites that may have been otherwise secure. If you visited one of these websites and entered credit card information during the hours of the breach, contact your provider immediately and cancel the card. If you visited one of the impacted websites from a mobile device, restart the device, I think that’s always sound advice in these situations.
At the end of the day, the JavaScript runs in the browser and none of the reports available indicate any browser escapes (other than the attacks on iOS), so the biggest risks were real-time, while the malicious JavaScript was available and, for the most part, financial in nature. With the breach contained, the malicious code removed, and websites operating normally, users should feel that they can once again visit these websites with confidence.
If you ever want to understand how intertwined websites are, the Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg (circl.lu) has a great tool called Lookyloo that lets you see these interactions. I took one host off the list, a streaming service that I use, crave.ca and analyzed it with Lookyloo. While I visited a single URL with a single hostname, the analysis reveals that 42 hostnames were involved in loading that page with
Remember, you are only as secure as the people who you work with. So you have to make sure that they are secure as well. Otherwise, you get pwned as the case was here.
UPDATE: Justin Beals, CEO & Founder, Strike Graph, an AI-native GRC and compliance automation platform:
“Report URI and Cynet moved fast. They caught the injected code, named all 178 affected organizations and gave site owners exact strings to search for within a day. Optimizely’s notice confirms a vulnerability and leaves out everything customers need: how many projects changed, when the fix went in, and whether the attacker still has access. Smartsheet’s snippet got cleaned and then re-infected, so those questions matter.
Report URI had to crawl 1,611 Optimizely snippets to figure out who was affected. That tells you most of these companies had no current record of what third-party code runs on their own pages. An SBOM is supposed to answer that question for the software you ship, but this attack happened in code nobody builds or ships. The snippet updates itself every time a setting changes, and the attacker rewrote the payload several times in one day, so a document generated once and filed away would have shown a clean list the whole time.
Organizations need to apply the SBOM discipline to everything their pages load at runtime. Keep a live inventory of every third-party script on every page, record what each one should contain, and check it continuously against what actually gets served. A company with that inventory could have answered three questions in minutes on Monday: do we load Optimizely, on which pages, and did the content change. Most spent the day waiting on the vendor. Expect assessors and customers to start asking for that runtime inventory as evidence, especially on any page that takes card data.”
UPDATE #2: More commentary has come in:
John Strand, Owner, Black Hills Information Security
“There are a couple of things about this that are absolutely terrifying. The first is that we still don’t know exactly what the initial attack vector was. It’s been quite a while, and I’m increasingly concerned that they may not actually know how the attackers got in.
“The second issue is much bigger, and it’s something every organization needs to understand. Security is no longer just about one organization protecting its own assets. We are all part of a massive, interconnected ecosystem of systems, vendors, cloud platforms, and SaaS services. A compromise in one organization can have serious consequences for dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of others.
“And quite frankly, I don’t think most organizations have their heads around what their total attack surface actually looks like when you start incorporating all the third-party SaaS products and services they depend on. You can do everything right within your own environment and still find yourself exposed through a service you don’t directly control. That’s a very uncomfortable reality that the security industry needs to start taking much more seriously.”
ㅤ
BB King, Director of Pentesting, Black Hills Information Security
“A standards-based defense against this kind of supply-chain attack is Subresource Integrity (SRI). SRI allows browsers to detect when a script has been modified and then refuse to execute that script. It is designed for exactly this scenario.”
ㅤ
Another Day…. Another Attack…. This Time With Optimizely
Posted in Commentary with tags Optimizely on November 17, 2026 by itnerdLet me introduce you to Optimizely. They bill themselves as “The AI platform to create and optimize every digital experience. So the experience-makers can do the work they love.” And they have just been pwned by a supply chain attack:
A supply chain attack targeting Optimizely has led to malicious JavaScript being loaded on numerous popular websites, including Zoom, CNN, Fox News, BBC, Salesforce, and GitLab, exposing visitors to scripts designed to steal cryptocurrency and payment information and exploit vulnerabilities in iOS devices.
Optimizely is a digital experience and experimentation platform used by organizations to test and personalize their websites, with its JavaScript files loaded into customers’ webpages to deliver this functionality.
The company confirmed to BleepingComputer that attackers exploited a vulnerability in its Experimentation account signup flow to inject malicious JavaScript into customer projects, causing websites using the platform to load malware.
I have commentary from Tyler Reguly, Associate Director of Security R&D of Fortra:
Years ago, websites were simple… a few lines of HTML, a markup language, that rendered information in your browser for human consumption. Today, websites might as well be complete software packages and, like software packages, they have dependencies. These dependencies come in the form of various JavaScript pages that are included from vendors and open-source projects designed to simplify life for the website developer, just as libraries simplify the lives of software developers.
The problem is that these dependencies are typically hosted with other vendors, which makes them part of your supply chain and opens the door for multiple breach vectors. Even if your environment is completely secure, every new dependency that you add is another window that needs to be locked, and you have no control over the lock.
That’s what happened here… Optimizely was breached, allowing attackers to compromise multiple other websites that may have been otherwise secure. If you visited one of these websites and entered credit card information during the hours of the breach, contact your provider immediately and cancel the card. If you visited one of the impacted websites from a mobile device, restart the device, I think that’s always sound advice in these situations.
At the end of the day, the JavaScript runs in the browser and none of the reports available indicate any browser escapes (other than the attacks on iOS), so the biggest risks were real-time, while the malicious JavaScript was available and, for the most part, financial in nature. With the breach contained, the malicious code removed, and websites operating normally, users should feel that they can once again visit these websites with confidence.
If you ever want to understand how intertwined websites are, the Computer Incident Response Center Luxembourg (circl.lu) has a great tool called Lookyloo that lets you see these interactions. I took one host off the list, a streaming service that I use, crave.ca and analyzed it with Lookyloo. While I visited a single URL with a single hostname, the analysis reveals that 42 hostnames were involved in loading that page with
Remember, you are only as secure as the people who you work with. So you have to make sure that they are secure as well. Otherwise, you get pwned as the case was here.
UPDATE: Justin Beals, CEO & Founder, Strike Graph, an AI-native GRC and compliance automation platform:
“Report URI and Cynet moved fast. They caught the injected code, named all 178 affected organizations and gave site owners exact strings to search for within a day. Optimizely’s notice confirms a vulnerability and leaves out everything customers need: how many projects changed, when the fix went in, and whether the attacker still has access. Smartsheet’s snippet got cleaned and then re-infected, so those questions matter.
Report URI had to crawl 1,611 Optimizely snippets to figure out who was affected. That tells you most of these companies had no current record of what third-party code runs on their own pages. An SBOM is supposed to answer that question for the software you ship, but this attack happened in code nobody builds or ships. The snippet updates itself every time a setting changes, and the attacker rewrote the payload several times in one day, so a document generated once and filed away would have shown a clean list the whole time.
Organizations need to apply the SBOM discipline to everything their pages load at runtime. Keep a live inventory of every third-party script on every page, record what each one should contain, and check it continuously against what actually gets served. A company with that inventory could have answered three questions in minutes on Monday: do we load Optimizely, on which pages, and did the content change. Most spent the day waiting on the vendor. Expect assessors and customers to start asking for that runtime inventory as evidence, especially on any page that takes card data.”
UPDATE #2: More commentary has come in:
John Strand, Owner, Black Hills Information Security
“There are a couple of things about this that are absolutely terrifying. The first is that we still don’t know exactly what the initial attack vector was. It’s been quite a while, and I’m increasingly concerned that they may not actually know how the attackers got in.
“The second issue is much bigger, and it’s something every organization needs to understand. Security is no longer just about one organization protecting its own assets. We are all part of a massive, interconnected ecosystem of systems, vendors, cloud platforms, and SaaS services. A compromise in one organization can have serious consequences for dozens, hundreds, or even thousands of others.
“And quite frankly, I don’t think most organizations have their heads around what their total attack surface actually looks like when you start incorporating all the third-party SaaS products and services they depend on. You can do everything right within your own environment and still find yourself exposed through a service you don’t directly control. That’s a very uncomfortable reality that the security industry needs to start taking much more seriously.”
ㅤ
BB King, Director of Pentesting, Black Hills Information Security
“A standards-based defense against this kind of supply-chain attack is Subresource Integrity (SRI). SRI allows browsers to detect when a script has been modified and then refuse to execute that script. It is designed for exactly this scenario.”
ㅤ
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