The Abstract ASTRO research team has just published a blog entitled: How Attackers Disable CloudTrail Without Calling StopLogging or DeleteTrail.
Security teams rely heavily on AWS CloudTrail as a source of truth for detecting breaches, but new research shows attackers can quietly disable or degrade logging without ever touching the APIs most defenders monitor.
In a new technical deep dive, ASTRO uncovers how adversaries are bypassing traditional detections (like StopLogging or DeleteTrail) and instead using lesser-known AWS APIs to blind logging systems while keeping them appearing fully operational.
Key findings that may interest your readers:
- Attackers can create “invisible activity zones” using PutEventSelectors, selectively excluding malicious actions from logs while CloudTrail continues to run normally.
- CloudTrail Lake can be silently neutralized via APIs like StopEventDataStoreIngestion and DeleteEventDataStore, halting or destroying long-term forensic visibility.
- Anomaly detection can be disabled outright by-passing empty parameters to PutInsightSelectors, removing automated detection of suspicious behavior.
- Critical guardrails can be dismantled through APIs like DeleteResourcePolicy and DeregisterOrganizationDelegatedAdmin, weakening cross-account protections.
- The real risk is in the sequence: individually, these API calls look like routine maintenance—but chained together, they allow attackers to erase evidence and evade detection entirely.
The research also outlines detection strategies, including how to identify subtle parameter changes and—more importantly—how to correlate multiple low-signal events into high-confidence alerts, something most SIEMs struggle to do.
This has major implications for DFIR teams and cloud security programs: organizations may believe they have full visibility, while attackers are actively operating in blind spots.
You can read the blog entry here: https://www.abstract.security/blog/how-attackers-disable-cloudtrail-without-calling-stoplogging-or-deletetrail
Security teams have growing blind spot in AI coding agents and attackers are already moving in
Posted in Commentary with tags Abstract Security on May 19, 2026 by itnerdAs enterprises race to deploy AI coding agents, a new security challenge is emerging: organizations are creating high-privilege endpoint activity that many SOCs can’t actually see.
New research from the Abstract ASTRO team in a blog post that went live today examines telemetry from Anthropic’s Claude Code and Cowork and finds these tools create a rich but largely untapped detection source. It’s a source that can expose everything from shell execution and file access to plugin installs, MCP server interactions, and sensitive data leakage. The scary part? Most teams aren’t monitoring it.
ASTRO’s research also demonstrates how attackers could abuse AI coding workflows using techniques such as TrustFall, a recently disclosed flaw that can trigger arbitrary code execution simply through project trust prompts, potentially enabling credential theft, persistence, or data exfiltration.
A few findings and angles that may resonate with security readers:
This speaks to a broader issue: security teams are entering an era where agent activity may need to be monitored the same way they monitor users, endpoints, and cloud infrastructure.
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