GitHub and PyPI both introduced new policies this week aimed at slowing down how fast malicious code can spread through the software supply chain. GitHub’s Dependabot will now wait at least three days before opening a pull request for a new package release, and PyPI is blocking new file uploads to any release older than 14 days, both closing the same window attackers have relied on: the gap between a malicious release going out and anyone noticing.
SecurityWeek has more:
To prevent the fast delivery of malicious code through the immediate fetching of brand-new releases, GitHub has introduced a Dependabot cooldown, where the automation tool waits for at least three days after a release has been published before opening a pull request.
“Waiting a few days before adopting a new release gives maintainers, security researchers, and automated scanners time to spot a malicious version and get it pulled before it ever reaches your pull requests,” GitHub explains.
The three-day cooldown only applies to non-security version bumps, and the behavior can be modified through the configuration option in the dependabot.yml.
“Three days as the default balances two goals: it pushes you past the window where most of these attacks live, and it doesn’t hold your dependencies back longer than necessary,” GitHub notes.
PyPI, on the other hand, is preventing the poisoning of releases older than 14 days by blocking the upload of new files to them.
“This restriction was put in place to prevent old and long-stable releases from being poisoned in case publishing tokens or workflows of PyPI projects were compromised. As far as we are aware, this has not yet been abused, but there is no technical reason beyond that attackers weren’t aware it was possible,” PyPI says.
The behavior will be enforced once ‘Upload 2.0 API’ and ‘Staged Previews’ have been standardized by PEP 694 and will affect only a small fraction of projects that still publish new files to older releases.
Maggie McDaniel, Global Head of Intelligence, iCOUNTER had this to say:
“This is exactly the kind of outcome effective public-private intelligence sharing is supposed to produce. Security researchers and the community kept surfacing the same pattern, a maintainer account gets compromised, a malicious release goes out, and automated tooling propagates it into thousands of projects before anyone has a chance to catch it, and instead of that staying a research finding, it became a platform-level policy change. A three-day cooldown on Dependabot and a 14-day lock on new uploads to existing PyPI releases won’t stop every attack, but they close the exact window that made this class of attack so effective: the gap between publication and detection. What I’d want to know now is whether other package ecosystems are watching this and building the same kind of delay into their own automation, because the ecosystems that don’t will be the ones attackers target next.”
This is a positive move. But it needs to be backed by knowing what goes into your applications without fail. Otherwise we will have a different version of the same problem.
New MCP Python SDK Vulnerability: Shakey Authentication Enables Unintended Access
Posted in Commentary with tags GitHub on October 29, 2026 by itnerdA newly discovered vulnerability in the official Model Context Protocol (MCP) Python SDK, CVE-2026-116684, could allow an MCP server to accept valid authentication tokens intended for other services through faulty validation of a token’s intended audience. When multiple services share an authorization server, a token issued for one service could potentially be used to access another.
For B2C brands serving consumers via mobile, the implications of the vuln go beyond AI infrastructure. Mobile apps rely on APIs to access customer accounts, personal information, loyalty points, payment-related functions, and other services. If authentication tokens are accepted cross-service, outside their intended context, attackers may exploit gaps between authentication and authorization to access services they shouldn’t.
Patched SDK versions are available, but administrators must explicitly enable audience validation. This vuln illustrates the need to protect API credentials and control which services are trusted to receive authenticated requests.
Approov CEO Ted Miracco, a mobile app security expert, offers perspective:
“A valid token only proves that a trusted issuer created it for someone, at some point, for some purpose.
“It doesn’t prove the three things the server needs to know: Was it issued for this service? Is the party presenting it the one it was issued to? Is the software presenting it genuine and unmodified?
“A hotel key card for room 312 is valid for certain dates, but it shouldn’t open room 410 or any other room, at issuance or at any time. Identity is not authority, and authorization must be decided at the point of use by the service actually being accessed, every time and under strict guardrails.
“A valid authentication token alone should not grant authorization to access a particular service.
“To prevent cross-service authentication failures as AI agents gain access to more enterprise systems, organizations need to upgrade and confirm that audience validation is switched on, and then audit MCP servers in use.
“Next, validate everything on every request: signature, issuer, expiry, audience and scope. Reject any token that wasn’t minted for your service, and never pass tokens through to downstream systems.
“Lastly, make tokens short-lived and narrowly scoped, and bind them to a key the client holds, so a token that is stolen or sent to the wrong place is useless anywhere else. Never provide long-lived secrets like credentials or API keys to access agents unilaterally.
“Mobile security experts learned long ago that secrets embedded in software will always be extracted. The answer was to verify the software itself before issuing it credentials. AI agents should be held to this same standard: prove what you are, then get a short-lived credential for one specific job. Not a universal, non-expiring one.”
It’s time again to patch all the things if this is your use case. The real question is when is patching not a solution.
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