Earlier this week a firmware update that was pushed to my HH4000 modem that powers my Bell Fibe Internet broke the ability for it to use the Advanced DMZ functionality that I have been using for almost a year now. That forced me to resort to a double NAT setup which was not ideal. But it kept me from being killed by my wife.
At the time I figured that there was some sort of issue between that firmware, and an ASUS firmware update that came out in May that caused similar issues. Now I am not so sure about that. Instead my current theory is that Bell might have been doing something to how the Advanced DMZ functionality works that caused this setup to break. I say that because Bell doesn’t put out release notes for their firmware updates. And even if they did, there’s no way to block firmware updates from happening or roll them back if you don’t like what you read. So you’re kind of at the mercy of Bell. But to be fair, that’s true for Rogers as well as any other ISP.
In any case, back to my experience since this firmware update came out. I have things working now. And this is how I did it:
- Go to 192.168.2.1 using a browser and be prepared to type in your HH4000 password
- Click on “Advanced Tools and Settings”
- Click on “DMZ”
At this point I removed my router from the “Active Device” section as illustrated from the picture below by clicking the “x” to the right of the device:

Once I did that, I removed the checkmark next to “Advanced DMZ” and turned off “DMZ” and clicked save. Then I rebooted the HH4000. Once I did that, I then did the following, which by the way, will eventually become my new recommendation in terms of how to enable the Advanced DMZ functionality. Once I get around to rewriting the instructions:
- Go to 192.168.2.1 using a browser and be prepared to type in your HH4000 password
- Click on “Advanced Tools and Settings”
- Go to “DHCP” and ensure that your router has a 192.168.2.xxx IP address.
- Click “Cancel”
- Click on “DMZ”
- Turn on “DMZ”
- Put a checkmark next to “Advanced DMZ”
- Under the word “Device”, find the MAC (Media Access Control) address for your router. That address is usually looks something like this: 2C:54:91:88:C9:E3. And it is likely located on the back or bottom of your router. Once you find it, click the “>” so that there is not only a checkmark next to it (as is the case with the first item in the screen shot), but it also gets copied to the right as pictured in the screen shot under the words “Active Device”. Alternately, you can look for the IP address that you confirmed earlier to find it.
- Click save.
At this point, pull the power to the HH4000 and wait a minute or two before plugging it back in.
That’s what enabled me to get my setup working without issues. Again, that implies to me that Bell changed something in this firmware. But like I said earlier, I have no way of confirming this. Thus why this happened in the first place is still a bit of a mystery to me.
A request to Bell users who have the Advanced DMZ setup and who have an HH4000, did this firmware update break things for you? Or was it a non-issue? I’d love to know to see if I am an edge case, or if there’s something going on here. Please leave a comment share your experience.
New York City Transit Has A Flaw Where You Can Be Tracked Via Your Credit Card Number… And Apple Pay Is Affected By This Flaw
Posted in Commentary with tags Apple on August 31, 2023 by itnerdFrom the “what the actual hell” department comes this story from 404 Media where a flaw in the New York City transit system fares system allows anyone to track anyone if they know the credit card and the expiry date.
In the mid-afternoon one Saturday earlier this month, the target got on the New York subway. I knew what station they entered the subway at and at what specific time. They then entered another station a few hours later. If I had kept monitoring this person, I would have figured out the subway station they often start a journey at, which is near where they live. I would also know what specific time this person may go to the subway each day.
During all this monitoring, I wasn’t anywhere near the rider. I didn’t even need to see them with my own eyes. Instead, I was sitting inside an apartment, following their movements through a feature on a Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) website, which runs the New York City subway system.
With their consent, I had entered the rider’s credit card information—data that is often easy to buy from criminal marketplaces, or which might be trivial for an abusive partner to obtain—and punched that into the MTA site for OMNY, the subway’s contactless payments system. After a few seconds, the site churned out the rider’s travel history for the past 7 days, no other verification required.
That’s bad to say the least. But what makes this worse is that Apple Pay which is supposed to be immune from this sort of attack is affected by this:
404 Media found that MTA’s trip history feature still works even when the user pays with Apple Pay. Apple told 404 Media it does not store or have access to the used card numbers, and does not provide these to merchants, including transit systems. Apple did not respond when asked to clarify how the MTA website feature works when a rider uses Apple Pay.
This is unacceptable because Apple advertises Apple Pay as being safer to use than your credit card because Apple is supposed to provide a one time and unique representation of your credit card to the merchant. And through some magic on the back end, it’s supposed to reconcile everything to your actual card. In short, the merchant should not have access to your actual card number. But in this case they clearly do. So is Apple lying about how Apple Pay works? That sounds harsh, but it’s a question that one must ask based on the facts above. And it would be in Apple’s interest to answer those questions quickly and transparently.
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